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Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis
Edward R. Morrisont
Executive orders, statutes, and precedent increasingly re-
quire cost-benefit analysis of regulations. Presidential executive
orders have long required executive agencies to submit regulatory
impact analyses1 to the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") before issuing regulations,2 and recent federal legislation
exhibits a trend toward mandatory cost-benefit analysis. For ex-
ample, the Toxic Substances Control Act,3 the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act,4 and the recent Safe Drinking
Water Act Amendments5 require the Environmental Protection
Agency to balance costs and benefits in regulating chemicals and
pesticides. In 1995, Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates
Act,' requiring cost-benefit analysis of all significant federal
regulations that require expenditures by state, local, or tribal
governments.7 Additionally, Congress has proposed several bills
t B.S. 1994, University of Utah; A.M. (Economics) 1997, The University of Chicago;
Ph.D. (Economics) Candidate 2000, J.D. Candidate 2000, The University of Chicago.
' A regulatory impact analysis assesses the potential costs and benefits (both mone-
tary and nonmonetary) of a rule. EO 12291, 46 Fed Reg 13193, 13194 (1981). The report
contains a "description of alternative approaches that could substantially achieve the
same regulatory goal at lower cost, together with an analysis of this potential benefit and
costs and a brief explanation of the legal reasons why such alternatives, if proposed, could
not be adopted." Id.
2 Although previous administrations issued executive orders encouraging agencies to
consider the economic impact of proposed regulations, President Reagan's executive order,
EO 12291,46 Fed Reg 13193, was the first to require cost-benefit analysis. Section 2 of EO
12291 required agencies to ensure that the social benefits of a proposed regulation exceed
its social costs. Id. In 1993, President Clinton issued EO 12866, 58 Fed Reg 51735 (1993),
which generally afflms the approach of the Reagan order. Unlike Reagan's order, how-
ever, EO 12866 § 1(b) merely endorses cost-benefit analysis as a tool for evaluating regula-
tory options and does not require that benefits outweigh costs. 58 Fed Reg at 51735-36.
See generally Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State,
62 U Chi L Rev 1, 3-7 (1995) (comparing the different approaches of the Reagan and
Clinton executive orders); OMB, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Fed-
eral Regulations, 62 Fed Reg 39352, 39355-57 (1997) (describing the development of
regulatory analyses in successive administrations).
3 15 USC § 2605(c)(1) (1994).
' 7 USC § 136(bb) (1994).
5 42 USCA § 300g-l(bX3) (1991 & Supp 1998).
6 Pub L No 104-4, 109 Stat 48 (1995), codified at 2 USCA §§ 1501 et seq (1997).
2 USCA § 1532(a).
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that would require federal agencies to apply cost-benefit analysis
to all rules.8
This trend raises important questions about the methods
agencies use to conduct cost-benefit analysis. To perform the
analysis, an agency must first quantify the stream of costs and
benefits that a regulation will generate in current and future pe-
riods.9 Quantification, however, is not enough. Because of the
time value of money (that is, a dollar today can be invested to
yield more than a dollar tomorrow), costs and benefits in different
periods are different "goods" and are not strictly comparable.
Therefore, the agency must choose a discount rate that will con-
vert future sums into present values. It can then use these pres-
ent values to compute the net benefit (or "net present value") of
the regulation.
Discount rates fundamentally influence judgments about the
need for and the effectiveness of cost-benefit analysis. In 1986,
OMB economist John Morrall documented extreme variation in
the value that regulations implicitly place on human life." On the
low end, a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA") regulation cost $100,000 per life saved;" on the high
end, an Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") rule cost $72 billion per life saved.'2 Although this
study has greatly influenced recent congressional and academic
proposals for regulatory reform," emerging scholarship shows
that Morrall's results depended critically on the discount rate he
' See, for example, Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, HR 1022, 104th
Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995); Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997, S 981, 105th Cong, 2d
Sess (June 27, 1997). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments,
and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan L Rev 247, 269-86 (1996) (describing regulatory reform
efforts of the 104th Congress); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future
of the Regulatory State, 63 U Chi L Rev 1463, 1528-32 (1996) (same).
' This Comment ignores 'incommensurability" issues-whether the value of life or
other nonmonetary benefits can be measured 'along a single metric without doing violence
to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized." Cass R. Sun-
stein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779, 796 (1994).
" John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, Regulation 25, 30 table 4 (Nov/Dec
1986).
"Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 Fed Reg 2408, 2414-15 (1967).
12 Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 50 Fed Reg 50412 (1985).
,See, for example, Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale
L J 1981 (1998). Heinzerling notes, id at 1983 n 2, that Morrall's statistics underlie Ste-
phen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 24-27 (Har-
vard 1993). For other commentary relying on Morrall's work, see Pildes and Sunstein, 62
U Chi L Rev at 105 & n 363 (cited in note 2); John D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3
NYU Envir L J 382, 398 n 79 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for
Judging Risk Regulation Policies, 3 NYU Envir L J 431, 449-50 n 42 (1994).
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chose, which differed markedly from the rates NHTSA and OSHA
actually employed. 4
The Morall study is just one example of how small variations
in the discount rate can have very large effects on the results of
cost-benefit analysis. Consider, for example, a proposed regula-
tion that will generate $100 in benefits in fifty years. The present
value 5 of this benefit is $61 at a 1 percent discount rate, $14 at 4
percent, $3 at 7 percent, and less than $1 at 10 percent. Unfortu-
nately, despite the importance of the discount rate in cost-benefit
analysis, few standards guide agency practice. Although OMB
has issued discount rate guidelines since 1972,"6 discount rates
vary significantly within and across agencies.
Few courts have reviewed agency discount rates, in part be-
cause relatively few statutes require agencies to conduct cost-
benefit analysis, and in part because there are no meaningful
standards of review for courts to apply. When courts have ad-
dressed the issue, they have either deferred to agency discretion
or imposed their own judgments about discounting. The absence
of standards for discounting is particularly troubling as cost-
benefit analysis has played an ever greater role in new legisla-
tion. Although several legal scholars have discussed this problem,
none has considered how economic theory can assist courts in re-
viewing agency discount rates.17
This Comment develops a framework for judicial review of an
agency's choice of discount rate. Part I discusses the striking
variation in the discount rates agencies use. Part II analyzes the
economic theory of discounting and develops a simple conceptual
framework for evaluating particular discount rates. Finally, Part
III uses this conceptual framework to establish a standard of re-
" See Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 1984-85 (cited in note 13).
The general formula for computing the present value (in discrete time) of a sum X
paid in n years, where the discount rate is r, is XI(1 + r)". Thus, when the discount rate is
5 percent, the present value of $100 paid in 50 years is 100/(I + .05)5 = $8.72.
'o See OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs; Guidelines and Discounts, 57
Fed Reg 53519, 53520 (1992), replacing and rescinding OMB Circular No A-94, Discount
Rate to be Used in Evaluating Time-Distributed Costs and Benefits (Mar 27, 1972).
" One article has explored the appropriate discount rate policy for regulatory agen-
cies. Daniel A. Farber and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount
Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 Vand L Rev 267 (1993). The authors,
however, do not address the appropriate standard of judicial review. Other commentators
have discussed agency discount rates without reference to judicial review. See, for exam-
ple, Heinzerling, 107 Yale L J at 2043-56 (cited in note 13); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting
the Environment for Future Generations: A Proposal for a "Republican" Superagency, 5
NYU Envir L J 444, 460-62 (1996). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law,
64 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1193-94 (1997).
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view that courts may apply when reviewing an agency's choice of
discount rate.
I. AGENCY PRACTICE: LARGE VARIATION WITHIN AND
ACROSS AGENCIES
Agencies exhibit striking inconsistencies in their use of dis-
count rates. Not only do different agencies use significantly dif-
ferent rates, but often a single agency employs very different
rates for various regulations. Administrative records offer little
explanation for this variation.
In an effort to standardize agency cost-benefit analysis, OMB
has issued discount rate guidelines since 1972."8 The most recent
guidelines, published in 1992, recommend a 7 percent real 9 dis-
count rate for analysis of all "public investments and regulatory
programs that provide benefits and costs to the general public."0
OMB asserts that this rate "approximates the marginal pretax
rate of return on an average investment in the private sector in
recent years."2' However, OMB acknowledges that alternative
rates may be appropriate in some cases. 2
OMB's guidelines appear to have had little effect on the dis-
count rates that agencies actually use.' This is evident in Tables
1 and 2 (following this Comment), which survey the discount
rates agencies have employed during the past five years. Table 1
focuses on long-term regulations that provide costs or benefits
over thirty or more years. Some agencies, such as the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA"), have used a relatively low rate of 3
percent; others, such as the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") and the Bureau of Reclamation, have employed rates in
excess of 7 percent. Further, individual agencies have used differ-
ent rates for different regulations. The EPA, for example, em.-
1" See OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg at 53520 (cited in
note 16).
" A real discount rate (as opposed to a nominal rate) excludes the premium for ex-
pected inflation.
OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg at 53522-23 (cited in
note 16). Prior to 1992, OMB recommended a 10 percent rate. OMB, Guidelines and Dis-
count Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg 35613, 35613-14
(1992).
21 OMB, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed Reg at 53523 (cited in note
16).
An agency, however, must gain OMB permission to use alternative discount rates,
such as the "shadow price of capital," instead of the recommended 7 percent rate. Id.
"OMB has acknowledged as much. See OMB, Draft Report to Congress, 62 Fed Reg at
39379 (cited in note 2), where OMB notes that the EPA did not use the recommended dis-
count rate in conducting its analysis of its lead-based paint rule.
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ployed a 3 percent discount rate for regulations of lead-based
paint but used 7 and 10 percent rates for regulations of drinking
water and emissions from locomotives. This variation in discount
rates has profound effects on the analysis of long-term regula-
tions. Consider the HUD regulation of lead-based paint.24 While
that regulation had net benefits of $1,080.2 million at a 3 percent
discount rate, it had net benefits of only $39 million at a 7 per-
cent rate.' Although HUD acknowledged this, it favored the 3
percent rate merely because the regulation affected future gen-
erations."
Slightly less inconsistency characterizes agency analyses of
short-term regulations that yield benefits and costs within the
next twenty years. Table 2 shows that most agencies use discount
rates between 7 and 10 percent. However, there is still significant
variation: several agencies, such as the EPA and the FDA,
have used 3 percent rates.
The administrative record offers little explanation for the
selection of discount rates. Many agencies employ discount rates
without discussing the theoretical or political reasons for choos-
ing a particular rate. This seems particularly true for the EPA."
II. THE THEORY OF DISCOUNT RATES
Scholars have long debated what discount rate is appropriate
for regulations and other public projects. The debate has ethical,
political, and economic dimensions. On one level, scholars debate
the threshold issue of whether it is sound public policy for regula-
"HUD, Requirements for Notification, Evaluation and Reduction of Lead-Based Paint
Hazards in Federally Owned Residential Property and Housing Receiving Federal Assis-
tance, 61 Fed Reg 29170 (1996).
2Id at 29189.
Id. HUD noted that EPA also uses a 3 percent rate. Id.
See EPA, Comprehensive Guideline for Procurement of Products Containing Recov-
ered Materials, 62 Fed Reg 60962, 60970 (1997) (employing a 3 percent rate over a ten-
year period).
"See Department of Health and Human Services, Tobacco Regulation for Substance
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grants, 61 Fed Reg 1492, 1504, 1506 (1996) (pre-
senting benefit-cost analysis results using both 3 and 7 percent discount rates).
Rare exceptions include the Department of Energy's regulation on energy conserva-
tion standards for consumer products, see Department of Energy, Energy Conservation
Program for Consumer Products, 58 Fed Reg 47326, 47333-35 (1993), and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration rules on natural resource damage assessments,
see Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Natu-
ral Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed Reg 440,453-54 (1996), where the agencies jus-
tify their decisions to depart from OMB guidelines. See discussion in Part III.C.
"See, for example, EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone; Labeling, 58 Fed Reg
8136, 8163 (1993) (offering alternative conclusions using a 2 percent and 7 percent rate
without providing an explanation for using either discount rate).
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tory agencies to discount future benefits, especially when those
benefits accrue to future generations. On another level, given the
choice to discount future costs and benefits, the debate becomes
more economic. Here scholars disagree whether regulatory agen-
cies should derive the appropriate discount rate from rates of re-
turn in financial markets or from a normative model of
intergenerational social welfare.
This Part surveys both levels of the debate. Part A addresses
the ethical, political, and economic debate over the threshold de-
cision to discount future costs and benefits, demonstrating that
sound public policy requires a regulatory agency to discount fu-
ture sums. Part B surveys the economic and political debate over
the appropriate discount rate. Finally, Part C synthesizes the
discussion in this Part and develops a simple conceptual frame-
work for choosing and evaluating discount rates.
A. The Philosophical Approach to Discount Rates
Philosophers,3 legal scholars, 2 and several economists33 have
questioned the ethical and logical theory underlying the decision
to discount future costs and benefits to future generations. A
strong intuition suggests that individual lives today are no more
or less valuable than lives in the future.' Just as a person's life
should not be treated as less valuable because the person lives
one hundred miles away, so too a life should not be treated as less
valuable because it will exist one hundred years in the future.
Thus philosophers and some economists have argued that a
zero discount rate should be used when evaluating projects with
consequences that may benefit or harm future generations.' This
31 See, for example, Derek Parfit, Rationality and Time, 1983/84 Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 47, 79-81; Derek Parfit, Energy Policy and the Further Future: The
Social Discount Rate, in Douglas MacLean and Peter G. Brown, eds, Energy and the Fu-
ture 31-37 (Rowman and Littlefield 1983); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 284-303
(Belknap 1971).
See, for example, Farber and Hemmersbaugh, 46 Vand L Rev at 289-300 (cited in
note 17); Mank, 5 NYU Envir L J at 448-50, 460-62 (cited in note 17).
See, for example, R.F. Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economics: Some Recent Devel-
opments of Economic Theory and their Application to Policy 37-40 (Macmillan 1948); A.C.
Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 24-26 (Macmillan 4th ed 1932); F.P. Ramsey, A Mathe-
matical Theory of Saving, in J.M. Keynes and D.H. MacGregor, eds, The Economic Jour-
nal: The Journal of the Royal Economic Society 543 (Macmillan 1928); Robert M. Solow,
The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 Am Econ Rev: Papers and
Proceedings 1, 7-14 (1974).
See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 203 (Yale 1980).
See id at 203; Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economics at 45 (cited in note 33); Parfit,
Energy Policy at 31, 36-37 (cited in note 31); Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving at
554 (cited in note 33); Solow, 64 Am Econ Rev: Papers and Proceedings at 9 (cited in note
33).
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approach recognizes that harms to future generations deserve no
less protection than harms to the current generation. As the re-
nowned economist Frank Ramsey explained: "[I]t is assumed that
we do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier
ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely
from the weakness of the imagination."36
Some commentators go further, arguing that the "present
generation has a fiduciary responsibility to see that future gen-
erations enjoy a parity of social value and opportunity."37 This fi-
duciary duty implies that the welfare of future generations, espe-
cially nearer ones, should be treated on par with (that is to say,
not discounted relative to) the welfare of the current generation."
This argument for zero discounting, however, does not deny
the time value of money-that a dollar tomorrow is worth less
than a dollar today (because a dollar can be invested today and
yield more than a dollar tomorrow). Indeed, proponents of zero
discount rates likely would agree that society should discount a
monetary sum payable to future generations. Society can be-
queath that benefit to future generations simply by investing a
smaller sum in financial markets today. Rather, proponents of
zero discounting argue that regulators should not discount non-
monetary benefits to future generations. Putting aside difficult
commensurability problems, society cannot bequeath these bene-
fits to future generations merely by investing in financial mar-
kets. This is especially true for environmental, health, and other
less tangible benefits that future generations may be. unable to
"buy," because previous generations caused irreversible damage
to the resources that provide these benefits. For example, if cur-
rent society improperly stores nuclear waste and leakage causes
the death of a child in some future generation, no sum will enable
the parent to "buy" back the child's life.
While reasonable, the ethical intuition that the state should
not discount benefits to future generations suffers from two
weaknesses. First, this ethical standard can beget apparently un-
ethical results. If the current generation is morally obligated to
treat the welfare of future generations on par with its own wel-
fare, then logic dictates that the current generation has a duty to
undertake almost any sacrifice, short of starvation, to benefit the
Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving at 261 (cited in note 33).
Mank, 5 NYU Envir L J at 448 (cited in note 17), referring to Ackerman, Social Jus-
tice at 203 (cited in note 34). See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 284-93 (cited in note
31); Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law and the Environment 63
(Cambridge 1988).
' See Farber and Hemmersbaugb, 46 Vand L Rev at 298-99 (cited in note 17).
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future.3 9 By foregoing consumption today and investing in proj-
ects that provide a stream of benefits for future generations, the
current generation suffers a finite sacrifice but generates an infi-
nite benefit (due to zero discounting) for the future.40 Indeed, the
moral intuition of zero discounting implies that it may be optimal
for the current generation to save two-thirds or more of its an-
nual income.4 This is unacceptable, however, for "individuals are
not morally required to subscribe fully to morality at any cost to
themselves." 2 Further, while the argument against discounting
seems compelling where future harms (such as the death of a
child) are irreversible, this argument is too powerful. Most, if not
all, regulations today seek to prevent some form of irreversible
damage in the future, perhaps in future generations. Therefore,
even the argument against discounting irreversible damage
would generate excessive sacrifice today.
Second, the moral intuition of zero discounting rests on the
questionable assumption that government policy should be based
on moral introspection rather than individuals' actual behavior.
Unless there is evidence that the current generation is not suffi-
ciently altruistic toward future generations (evidence of a market
failure), the observed behavior of individuals may be the most re-
liable indicator of the beliefs and values that should dictate policy
choices in a democracy. Relative to the government, parents (the
current generation) probably have superior information about op-
timal investments in the welfare of their children (future genera-
tions). Further, even if surveys indicate that a majority of the
members of the current generation favors a zero discount rate,
this finding is not persuasive if individuals in society behave as if
they discount the future. Discounting may be a good description
"See Kenneth J. Arrow, Discounting, Morality, and Gaming 3-8, working paper (Dec
24, 1996), available online at <http://www-econ.stanford.edu/econ/wk-workp/swp970004.
html> (visited July 6, 1998).
See id at 5.
"See id at 6-7, developing a simple model of optimal investment and saving in a world
that lasts forever. Empirical estimates of the model's parameters suggest that the optimal
savings rate is two-thirds or greater.
42 Id at 2. Philosophers and legal scholars reject this criticism, claiming that it con-
fuses intergenerational efficiency and intergenerational equity. See Tyler Cowen and
Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin,
eds, Justice between Age Groups and Generations 148-49 (Yale 1992); Farber and Hem-
mersbaugh, 46 Vand L Rev at 291-92 (cited in note 17). In reality, society maximizes two
objectives: total welfare and intergenerational equity. See Cowen and Parfit, Against the
Social Discount Rate at 149 ("[Wle should not simply aim for the greatest net sum of bene-
fits. We should have a second moral aim: that these benefits be fairly shared between dif-
ferent generations."), citing Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 297-98 (cited in 31).
"For a well-known statement of this principle of economic modeling, see Milton
Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Kurt R. Leube, ed, The Essence of
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of individual behavior, and a good guide for public policy, re-
gardless of whether individuals believe they discount the future
or not.
B. The Economic Approach to Discount Rates
Economic theory offers two principal theories for discounting
costs and benefits to future generations: the opportunity cost of
capital ("OCC") and the social rate of time preference ("SRTP").
Both theories provide strong political and ethical support for posi-
tive discount rates. However, economists disagree whether the
OCC or SRTP should guide regulators.4" Although the two theo-
ries are logically consistent," they generate very different dis-
count rates in practice. The SRTP yields relatively low rates,
around 1 to 3 percent.4' In contrast, the OCC generally produces
rates in excess of 5 percent.48 This Part introduces the two theo-
ries and reviews the major issues underlying the debate.
1. Opportunity cost of capital.
a) The economic theory. The cost of a public investment is
not merely the value of the resources consumed. It also includes
the opportunity cost of those resources. The opportunity cost re-
flects the value of the next best use of the resources, such as in-
vestment in the private sector. Consider, for example, a proposed
regulation that costs $1 million today and promises to reduce
Friedman 161-66 (Hoover Institution 1987).
"Kenneth J. Arrow has demonstrated that this is actually the case in
Intergenerational Equity and the Rate of Discount in Long-Term Social Investment 19-20,
working paper (Dec 1995), available online at <http'l/www-econ.stanford.edu/econ/workp/
swp97005.html> (visited July 5, 1998). Even in a world where each generation wants to
treat all future generations equally, every generation will behave as if it discounts the fu-
ture. This occurs because, as the philosophical critique recognizes, no generation will
make excessive sacrifices for the future. Every generation is slightly selfish. Consequently,
each generation strategically decides how many resources to transfer to the next genera-
tion, given that the next generations may decide not to transfer these resources to the fur-
ther future. The result of this strategic interaction is a savings rate that corresponds to a
positive rate of discount on the welfare of future generations.
See id at 3-10.
See Robert C. Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues Relating to the Discount Rate for
Evaluating National Energy Options, in Robert C. Lind, ed, Discounting for Time and Risk
in Energy Policy 27 (Resources for the Future 1982).
"T See Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity, Discounting and Economic Effi-
ciency, in James P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee, and Erik F. Haites, eds, Climate Change 1995
131-33 (Cambridge 1996); Richard D. Morgenstern, Conducting an Economic Analysis:
Rationale, Issues, and Requirements, in Richard D. Morgenstern, ed, Economic Analyses at
EPA- Assessing Regulatory Impact 36 (Resources for the Future 1997).
" See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 132-33 (cited in note 47); Morgenstern,
Conducting an Economic Analysis at 36 (cited in note 47).
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pollutants that will cause damaging climate change in fifty years.
If nothing is done to control the pollutants today, fifty years from
now future society will suffer damage requiring $10 million in
abatement costs. At first blush, the regulation appears attractive:
a $1 million investment avoids a $10 million expenditure in the
future. No conclusion about the desirability of the regulation can
be drawn, however, without considering the next best use of the
$1 million investment today. If the resources could be invested in
an asset, such as a long-term bond with a 5 percent return, soci-
ety would be better served if the government avoided the regula-
tion: the bond would yield over $10 million in fifty years,4 9 leaving
future generations with more than enough resources to combat
the environmental damage. In other words, at a 5 percent dis-
count rate, the proposed regulation does not pass the cost-benefit
test because it has a negative net present value.
A standard measure of the opportunity cost of a public in-
vestment is the interest rate on assets with similar risk and du-
ration in private financial markets. Public investment generally
displaces private investment because it takes resources out of the
private sector, either directly (through taxes) or indirectly
(through the private costs of complying with regulations)." Pri-
vate assets, therefore, represent the next best investment oppor-
tunities for the resources used for public investments.5
The fundamental intuition underlying the OCC approach is
that the government should choose projects that maximize the re-
sources available to future generations, not those that maximize
particular aspects of future welfare, such as environmental well-
being. Because the current generation cannot know the economic
constraints facing future generations, it is better for the current
generation to invest in their general well-being by choosing the
projects with the highest rates of return. As proponents of this
approach argue:
Insofar as we today should consider the welfare of future
generations, our duty lies not in leaving them exactly the so-
cial and environmental life we think they ought to have, but
rather in making it possible for them to inherit a climate of
open choices-that is, in leaving behind a larger level of gen-
eral fluid resources to be redirected as they, not we, see fit.52
The actual payoffofthe bond would be ($1,000,000)x(1.05)5o=$11,467,340.
See, for example, Arrow, Intergenerational Equity at 7 (cited in note 44); William J.
Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 Am Econ Rev 788, 789-93 (1968).
51 See generally Discounting an Uncertain Future, FEEM Newsletter 24 (Dec 1997).
Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 133 (cited in note 47), quoting Aaron Wildav-
[65:13331342
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b) Applying the economic theory. The OCC is a descriptive
approach to the choice of a social discount rate.53 The approach
assumes that the price system-in particular, the rate of return
available in financial markets-accurately reflects the scarcity of
resources, expectations about the future, and societal preferences
regarding future consumption vis-h-vis current consumption. The
OCC approach makes no assumption about what the social dis-
count rate should be.
The OCC approach, however, is complicated and may not be
appropriate for evaluating all public projects. Critics have identi-
fied several limitations to the OCC approach. To begin, the OCC
is not directly observable. Rates of return in financial markets in-
clude premia for risk,' the expected rate of inflation, and taxes
that should not affect the social discount rate. Scholars have
shown that once these factors are subtracted, the discount rate
(in real terms) will generally exceed 5 percent, but it may be as
low as 1 percent.55 The particular rate will vary over time and will
change with expectations regarding the welfare of future genera-
tions. Critics, however, note that it is very difficult to adjust ob-
served rates of return for taxation, risk, and other factors.56
sky, Searching for Safety 216 (Transaction Books 1988).
See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 132-33 (cited in note 47).
Although risk-averse investors demand a premium to compensate for the risk of an
asset, most scholars agree that no such premium is necessary for government investments
because (1) the government's investment portfolio (its collection of regulations and in-
vestments) is sufficiently broad to eliminate most diversifiable risk, see Baumol, 58 Am
Econ Rev at 794 (cited in note 50), and (2) even if a government investment is risky, the
cost of risk-bearing is trivial when it is spread among taxpayers, see Kenneth J. Arrow
and Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 Am
Econ Rev 364, 370-74 (1970).
See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 133 (cited in note 47); Raymond J. Kopp
and Paul R. Portney, Mock Referenda for Intergenerational Decisionmaking, 5 Discussion
Paper 97-48 (Resources for the Future 1997), available online at <http=//www.rff.org/
discpapers/PDF._ files/9748.pdf> (visited July 5, 1998).
See Richard H. Thaler and George Loewenstein, Intertemporal Choice, in Richard H.
Thaler, ed, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life 105-06
(Princeton 1996). Additionally, some scholars object to the use of the OCC when an agency
evaluates benefits to future generations because financial markets generally do not offer
assets that pay out in future generations. See Farber and Hemmersbaugh, 46 Vand L Rev
at 296-97 (cited in note 17); FEEM Newsletter, Discounting at 24-25 (cited in note 51). The
OCC makes most sense where financial markets offer assets with term structures that are
similar to regulations that agencies are considering. In such situations, the agency can di-
rectly compare the payoff of the regulation to the payoff of the asset. Where the regulation
involves intergenerational welfare, financial markets are unhelpful and therefore the OCC
approach is inappropriate. This objection, however, merely points out a complication of the
OCC; it does not undermine the approach. Financial markets will exist in future genera-
tions, so there are trading strategies whereby individuals could invest sequentially in pri-
vate assets that collectively have a duration comparable to the long-term public project.
The expected rate of return on this strategy would be one logical discount rate for the
public investment.
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Additionally, critics note that the OCC approach assumes
that public projects and regulations divert resources (via taxa-
tion) from capital markets. To the contrary, evidence suggests
that, in the absence of taxation, members of society would invest
only a fraction of their resources in credit markets57 and would
consume the rest. Therefore, to the extent that regulations are fi-
nanced by resources that would otherwise be consumed, the OCC
may overstate the appropriate rate of discount. Instead, the
SRTP, which measures the rate at which society is willing to
trade current and future consumption, may be closer to the rele-
vant rate.58
These considerations have led some economists to conclude
that the appropriate discount rate may vary with the type of
regulation or public project and how it is financed. When the gov-
ernment relies on debt to finance the regulation, the OCC pro-
vides more accurate results.59 When government relies on taxes,
however, a combination of the OCC approach and the SRTP ap-
proach may be more appropriate.60 At least one economist, how-
ever, has questioned this notion that the discount rate should
vary with the government's source of funds.6' Whether the state
uses debt or taxes to finance regulations, it is essentially impos-
ing a tax on production by diverting inputs from productive proc-
esses (firms). Therefore, the appropriate discount rate will always
be the OCC.
2. Social rate of time preference.
a) The economic theory. While the OCC relies on observable
behavior to derive the social discount rate, the SRTP relies on
theory to derive that rate. Standard economic theory hypothe-
sizes,62 and empirical evidence confirms,' that individuals value
See Arrow, Intergenerational Equity at 9 (cited in note 44).
See id; see also Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues at 29-32 (cited in note 46); Joel
D. Scheraga, Perspectives on Government Discounting Policies, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt S-
65, S-67 (1990). The SRTP is discussed in the following Part.
See, for example, Scheraga, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at S-65 (cited in note 58).
The appropriate discount rate would be a weighted average of the rates derived from
the OCC and SRTP approaches, where the weights are approximately equal to the propor-
tion of funds that displaces investment (for the OCC-based rate) and the proportion that
displaces consumption (for the SRTP-based rate). See Larry A. Sjaastad and Daniel L.
Wisecarver, The Social Cost of Public Finance, 85 J Pol Econ 513, 514-16 (1977).
6' See Baumol, 58 Am Econ Rev at 791-92 (cited in note 50).
See generally Maureen L. Cropper and Frances G. Sussman, Valuing Future Risks
to Life, 19 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 160, 173-74 (1990) (applying standard theory to the
problem of valuing future risks to life); Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and
Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 732-36 (Oxford 1995) (describing standard theory of
intertemporal choice and the theory underlying discounting).
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current consumption more than future consumption. The rate at
which a person will trade (via a hypothetical asset) current for fu-
ture consumption is known as the individual rate of time prefer-
ence. Analogously, the social rate of time preference represents
the rate at which members of society, on average, are willing to
trade current benefits for future benefits. The appropriate meas-
ure of the SRTP, however, depends on the government's theory of
intergenerational welfare: different models of welfare imply dif-
ferent measures of the SRTP.
Most welfare models, in which the current government
chooses projects to maximize the joint welfare of all generations,
show that the SRTP can be written as the sum of two compo-
nents: pure time preference and the growth rate of per capita in-
come." Pure time preference is a measure of preferences, reflect-
ing each generation's desire (or impatience) to receive benefits
sooner rather than later.' The more impatient the present gen-
eration, the higher the discount rate on benefits to future genera-
tions. The growth rate of per capita income is a measure of scar-
city, reflecting the relative incomes of different generations.' The
higher the income of future generations relative to the current
generation (that is, the higher the growth rate of per capita in-
come), the higher the discount on benefits to future generations.
The pure time preference component is controversial because
it might reflect myopia, a special affinity for nearer generations,
or some other defect in "our telescopic faculty" that should not
guide government decisions about intergenerational welfare.'
This criticism is valid insofar as the observed "myopia" of the cur-
rent generation imposes some negative externality on future gen-
' See, for example, Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Environmental
Health Risks: New Evidence and Policy Implications, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt S-51, S-61
(1990) (providing evidence that workers discount future job-related health and safety haz-
ards at a 2 percent rate); Thaler and Loewenstein, Intertemporal Choice at 92 (cited in
note 56) (discussing evidence that discount rates vary with age, irrespective of whether
the future outcome is a gain or loss, or whether the size of the gain or loss is large or
small).
"See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 134-35 (cited in note 47). There the
authors illustrate a popular welfare model: a continuous-time welfare function, where the
welfare of each generation is additively separable. In this model, the optimality conditions
for public investment yield the expression: A+pg=SRTP. Here, A is a measure of pure time
preference ("impatience"), g is the growth rate of per capita income, and P, is a scale factor
equal to the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption (for simplicity, this
scale factor can be treated as constant and ignored). While A is constant over time, pg will
vary with per capita income. The higher the rate of income growth, g, the higher is the so-
cial rate of discount r.
See id at 131, 136.
"See id.
Pigou, The Economics of Welfare at 25 (cited in note 33).
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erations, who would pay the current generation to be less myopic
if such payments were possible. Thus, the government should
override societal preferences in favor of intergenerational wel-
fare." However, given that individuals are altruistic toward fu-
ture generations (for example, children and grandchildren), it is
unclear when the preferences of the current generation will exert
a negative externality on future generations.69
In contrast, the SRTP's dependence on economic growth has
strong economic and ethical justifications. If future generations
will be better off than the current generation, optimal resource
allocation suggests that the current generation should favor pub-
lic investments with immediate payoffs over those that benefit fu-
ture generations.7" Similarly, the ethical notion that one genera-
tion should not sacrifice excessively for another implies that
regulatory agencies should discount benefits to future genera-
tions-who will be better off than current citizens anyway-when
evaluating potential projects. 1
b) Applying the economic theory. The SRTP is a prescriptive
approach to the social discount rate. It assumes that society
should maximize an arbitrarily chosen intergenerational welfare
function,72 and then derives the social discount rate from the op-
timality conditions of that function. This approach, however,
raises at least three controversial ethical, political, and economic
issues.
First, while the OCC approach relies on observable economic
behavior, the SRTP rejects such evidence in favor of normative
models of intergenerational welfare. Thus the SRTP implicitly
assumes a market failure: financial markets provide a poor indi-
cator of society's willingness to invest in particular projects (such
as climate control) that benefit future generations.7" The source of
this market failure is unclear. The failure may result from infor-
mation problems, such as the current generation's inability to as-
Many economists do not believe that myopic societal preferences justify government
intervention. See, for example, Kopp and Portney, Mock Referenda at 5 (cited in note 55).
See also Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 136 (cited in note 47), where the authors
note that a nonzero pure rate of time preference may be defensible because "as a matter of
description, the current generation gives less value to consumption of future generations."
"Once we account for altruism, the societal discount rate will be a function of the rate
of intergenerational altruism. See Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family 162-69 (Har-
vard Enlarged ed 1991).
See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 131, 136-37 (cited in note 47).
See id at 136.
See, for example, the welfare function discussed in note 64.
See Sjaastad and Wisecarver, 85 J Pol Econ at 515-16 (cited in note 60).
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sess the costs to future generations (for example, pollution miti-
gation, medical costs, and risks of mortality) if a particular regu-
lation is not imposed.74 Alternatively, the market failure may re-
flect myopia: members of the current generation may not care
sufficiently about (or may not be sufficiently altruistic toward) fu-
ture generations, who would be willing to pay members of the
current generation to invest in particular projects.75 In either
case, however, the government likely cannot test whether the
market failure is sufficiently serious to warrant the normative
approach of the SRTP, which effectively overrides observed socie-
tal preferences in favor of a particular welfare model.
Second, even assuming market failures warrant the SRTP
approach, it is unclear whether an agency can identify an appro-
priate intergenerational welfare function and whether that func-
tion will generate discount rates that yield better outcomes than
rates derived by the OCC approach.76 Critics claim that even the
most simple (and popular) welfare functions yield unreasonable
discount rates that are "glaringly inconsistent" with the observed
behavior of governments.77 Further, if the SRTP yields a social
discount rate that differs from the rate based on the OCC-
thereby forcing society to invest at a rate that differs from market
rates-government regulation may not have its intended effect on
future generations. Society today can only control the welfare of
the immediately succeeding generation.78 If government today at-
tempts to influence further generations by investing in irreversi-
ble projects (such as climate control technology), intermediate
generations will merely reduce their investments in the future if
they believe that the original investment was excessive. Such a
reduction in investments is particularly likely to occur if techno-
logical changes have made the original investments worthless.79
' See, for example, Amartya. & Sen, Approaches to the Choice of Discount Rates for
Social Benefit-Cost Analysis, in Lind, ed, Discounting for Time and Risk at 349-50 (cited in
note 46).
Id at 349.
See Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 131-33 (cited in note 47).
Id at 132. The authors further note that a "discount rate of 2% implies far more in-
vestment than actually occurs in any country now, and thus would require a big jump in
savings rates to finance." Id at 133.
7' See Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 Tex L Rev 1465, 1482
(1989); Arrow, Discounting, Morality, and Gaming at 12 (cited in note 39).
' This is a variant of the theory of Ricardian Equivalence, which states that govern-
ment generally cannot force one generation to save for the next by imposing a tax or in-
vesting in long-term assets. This forced saving will be "undone" as members of the first
generation reduce their private bequests to future generations. For the basic theory of Ri-
cardian Equivalence, see Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J Pol
Econ 1095 (1974).
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Contrary to the beliefs of some commentators," economic theory
provides strong support for the principle that current society best
serves future generations by choosing investments that maximize
general welfare in the future, not by choosing investments that
protect future societies against particular problems.8
Finally, even if a regulator can identify a proper
intergenerational welfare function, the regulator faces complex
methodological problems. Consider the simple welfare function
that describes the SRTP as a function of pure time preference and
the growth rate of per capita income. Scholars debate how to
measure these components of the SRTP. Although the typical ap-
proach is to derive the components from studies of individual be-
havior, studies in behavioral economics show that individual time
preference may vary with age,.income, the type of future payoff
(that is to say, whether the payoff is a gain or loss, or whether it
involves risk to future lives), and the amount of time until the
payoff.82 Indeed, some studies indicate that the SRTP may be
much higher than scholars have generally believed and may even
exceed the OCC.' The SRTP theory offers no guidance here.
Additionally, once an agency computes the SRTP, it faces
significant difficulties in applying the rate." Unlike the OCC, the
SRTP is an appropriate discount rate for future consumption.
Thus, an administrative agency must convert all costs and bene-
fits of a proposed regulation into consumption equivalents; as in
the OCC approach, the costs of a proposed regulation include the
private investment that it displaces.'
3. A conceptual framework.
As a threshold matter, it seems unreasonable for agencies
not to discount benefits to future generations in their cost-benefit
analyses of proposed rules. To begin, without a discount rate, the
analysis fails to account for the opportunity cost of resources that
are diverted from private investment toward investment in the
See Farber and Hemmersbaugh, 46 Vand L Rev at 298-99 (cited in note 17).
See Arrow, Discounting, Morality, and Gaming at 12 (cited in note 39).
See generally Thaler and Loewenstein, Intertemporal Choice at 92-106 (cited in note
56).
"See id. See also Robert C. Lind, Reassessing the Government's Discount Rate Policy
in Light of New Theory and Data in a World Economy with a High Degree of Capital Mo-
bility, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt S-8, S-19 (1990), in which the author points to evidence
that credit card debtors pay interest rates in excess of 16 percent.
See Morgenstern, Conducting an Economic Analysis at 36 (cited in note 47); Scher-
aga, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at S-66 (cited in note 58).
"See Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues at 39-55 (cited in note 46); Lind, 18 J Envir
Econ & Mgmt at S-11 (cited in note 83).
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proposed rule. Having no discount rate may lead the agency to
adopt rules that reduce the welfare of future generations, because
the resources could have been invested in assets with higher
rates of return. Additionally, a zero discount rate biases cost-
benefit analysis in favor of rules that impose excessive sacrifices
on the current generation. Finally, a zero discount rate is incon-
sistent with the observable behavior of individuals, which is ar-
guably the best guide for policy in a democratic state.
The choice of discount rate is primarily a matter of policy and
secondarily a matter of methodology.' Policy judgments largely
dictate the choice between the two competing approaches to dis-
counting. The OCC approach assumes that succeeding genera-
tions will be in the best position-because of superior informa-
tion-to deal with environmental, health, or other problems.
Therefore, the optimal regulatory policy is to maximize the
wealth of succeeding generations. In contrast, the SRTP approach
assumes that current society may be in a better position to deal
with particular problems, such as global warming and nuclear
waste storage. Thus, the SRTP overrides market prices and
chooses seemingly suboptimal investments (relative to prevailing
market rates of return) to ensure that future generations do not
suffer these risks. Thus, agency choice between the OCC and
SRTP approaches should be based, in part, on a determination
whether current society is in a better position to deal with long-
term problems.
Methodological issues determine the relative costs of apply-
ing the OCC or SRTP approaches. While the OCC approach re-
quires detailed information about alternative financial assets and
adjustments for taxes, risk, and inflationary expectations, the
SRTP requires complex estimates of parameters such as the pure
rate of time preference and the growth rate of per capita income.8'
Additionally, the SRTP approach requires an agency to determine
the precise effects of the regulation on future consumption. Al-
though the regulation may raise future consumption by improv-
ing air quality or other public goods, the project may also lower
future consumption by diverting funds from private investment.
The agency must subtract this "opportunity cost" of the regula-
tion, which raises precisely the same issues as in the OCC ap-
proach (specifically, the agency must adjust market rates of re-
turn for risk, taxes, inflation, and other distortions).
This is also described in Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 134 (cited in note 47).
Additionally, as shown in note 64, the SRTP also requires an estimate of a scale fac-
tor representing the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to per capita income.
1998] 1349
The University of Chicago Law Review
On balance, policy and methodology issues favor the OCC
over the SRTP. Because the current generation cannot know the
resource constraints or preferences of future generations, regula-
tors take large gambles with scarce resources when they follow
the SRTP approach and invest in particular environmental, en-
ergy, or other projects that have lower returns than assets in fi-
nancial markets. Like the Malthusian predictions of over-
population," these gambles may prove mistaken because they are
based on incomplete information about market failures in finan-
cial markets and the capabilities of future generations to contend
with environmental and other harms. Future generations would
be better served (and better able to contend with future harms) if
the government invests in rules that maximize their general wel-
fare and enable them to make their own choices regarding the
environment, energy, and other public goods.Additionally, methodological issues favor the OCC approach
because it is much simpler to calculate and apply.89 While the
OCC relies on observable financial market data, the SRTP re-
quires that the regulator select a particular welfare function, de-
rive an expression for the social discount rate, and identify em-
pirical analogues for the parameters of the discount rate. Addi-
tionally, the regulator must convert all benefits and costs (in-
cluding opportunity costs) into consumption equivalents.
H. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DISCOUNT RATES
Very few courts have reviewed agency discount rates. When
courts have reached the issue, they have either deferred to
agency discretions° or imposed their own judgment about dis-
counting.91 No court has developed a meaningful standard of re-
view for agency choice of discount rates. This is troubling because
legislation increasingly requires cost-benefit analysis. As such
legislation is enacted, courts will encounter challenges to the
methods-including discount rates-agencies use to conduct the
See generally Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analy-
sis with Special Reference to Education 323-25 (Chicago 3d ed 1993).
See Raymond J. Kopp, Alan J. Krupnick, and Michael Toman, Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Regulatory Reform: An Assessment of the Science and the Art 41, available online at
<http://www.rff.orgldiscpapers/PDF-files/9719.pdf> (visited July 5, 1998); Morgenstern,
Conducting an Economic Analysis at 36-37 (cited in note 47).
' See, for example, Ohio v Department of Interior, 880 F2d 432, 465 (DC Cir 1989) (de-
ferring to Department's choice of discount rate, which is "first and foremost a policy
choice").
" See, for example, Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201, 1218 (5th Cir
1991), citing popular press-What Price Posterity?, The Economist 73 (Mar 23, 1991)-for
the principle that if EPA discounts future costs, it must also discount future benefits.
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analysis. Judicial review will prevent arbitrary agency decisions
and ensure that statutory cost-benefit requirements have force.
Without standards to cabin agency discretion, cost-benefit analy-
sis may become mere window dressing, providing a veneer of sci-
entific backing for agencies' arbitrary choices."
This Part proposes a standard for judicial review. First, Part
A briefly indicates when a court should review agency discount
rates. Part B then shows that significant uncertainty surrounds
the standard of review that courts should apply to discount rates.
In an effort to resolve the uncertainty, this Part proposes a stan-
dard of review based on the conceptual framework developed in
Part 11. Finally, Part C illustrates the proposed standard of re-
view by applying it to discount rates that agencies have employed
in recent cost-benefit analyses.
A. When Judicial Review Is Appropriate
A court will review agency discount rates when either the
underlying statute requires cost-benefit analysis or the agency
relies on such analysis to justify a rule, adjudication, or exercise
of discretion.
Statutes increasingly contain direct or indirect requirements
for traditional cost-benefit analysis or a less rigorous comparison
of the costs and benefits of a regulation. Direct requirements ap-
pear in such statutes as the Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA"), which requires the agency to consider "reasonably as-
certainable economic consequences of the rule,"93 and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), which re-
quires the agency to promulgate regulations of toxins after con-
sidering the environmental, economic, and social impact of the
regulations.' Similarly, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
("EPCA") requires the Department of Energy to assess whether
an energy conservation regulation is economically justified,95 and
" See, for example, Scheraga, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at S-66 (cited in note 58) (The
author, an EPA official, noted that "many discounting procedures are subject to manipula-
tion.... This can lead to manipulation of the outcomes by some clever (or perhaps igno-
rant) analyst").
15 USC § 2605(cXl) ("In promulgating any rule under... this section with respect
to a chemical substance or mixture, the Administrator shall consider and publish a state-
ment with respect to... the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule,
after consideration of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological in-
novation, the environment, and public health.").
"7 USC § 136(bb) defines an "unreasonable adverse effect on the environment" as
"any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, so-
cial, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide."
42 USC § 6295(oX2XBXi)(I) (1994) (providing that the Department of Energy must
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the 1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA7)
explicitly require cost-benefit96 and risk-risk7 analysis of all ma-
jor drinking water regulations. Additionally, under the Un-
funded Mandates Act,98 all federal agencies must conduct cost-
benefit analysis of any rule requiring significant (over $100 mil-
lion) expenditures by state, local, or tribal governments. 9
Indirect requirements for cost-benefit analysis appear in
statutes mandating reasonable regulations, such as regulations
that are "reasonably necessary" or that reduce an "unreasonable
risk." In American Textile Manufacturers' Institute, Inc v Dono-
van (the Cotton Dust case),"° the Supreme Court noted that Con-
gress likely intends cost-benefit analysis where a statute uses the
phrase "unreasonable risk."'' Similarly, many lower courts have
found requirements for cost-benefit analysis in statutory lan-
guage calling for "reasonably necessary" regulations."
Where statutes contain such direct or indirect language re-
quiring cost-benefit analysis, courts can and should review the
methods that agencies use, especially their choice of discount
rate. In Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA,"°3 the Fifth Circuit re-
viewed the EPA's choice of discount rate under the TSCA,'O° and
in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v Herrington,"°5 the
D.C. Circuit reviewed the agency's discount rate in a rulemaking
consider, among other things, "the economic impact of the standard on manufacturers and
on the consumers of products subject to such standard").
42 USCA §300g-l(b)(3)(C)(i) provides that "[w]hen proposing any national primary
drinking water regulation that includes a maximum contaminant level, the Administrator
shall" analyze the costs of complying with the regulation and "[tihe incremental costs and
benefits associated with each alternative maximum contaminant level considered."
Id § 300g-1(bX3XC)(i)(VI) (requiring the Administrator to consider "[a]ny increased
health risk that may occur as the result of compliance, including risks associated with co-
occurring contaminants").
2 USCA §§ 1501 et seq.
2 USCA § 1532(a).
1-452 US 490 (1981).
'"Id at 510 n 30. However, in the same decision, the Court noted that statutory lan-
guage calling for regulation "to the extent feasible" creates no obligation to conduct such
analysis. Id at 509. For further discussion of statutory language that may or may not re-
quire cost-benefit analysis, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 419, 435 (1989).
"See, for example, National Grain and Feed Association v OSHA, 866 F2d 717, 728
(5th Cir 1988); United Automobile Workers v OSHA, 938 F2d 1310, 1319 (DC Cir 1991)
("Cost-benefit analysis is certainly consistent with the language" of the statute.); Alabama
Power Co v OSHA, 89 F2d 740, 746 (11th Cir 1996) ("Although the agency does not have to
conduct an elaborate cost-benefit analysis, it does have to determine whether the benefits
expected from the standard bear a reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the
standard."), citingAmerican Petroleum Institute v OSHA, 581 F2d 493, 503 (5th Cir 1978).
'"947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991).
"'Id at 1218.
'"768 F2d 1355 (DC Cir 1985).
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pursuant to the EPCA.0 6 Similarly, in Ohio v Department of Inte-
rior, ' 7 the D.C. Circuit reviewed the agency's choice of discount
rate in a rulemaking pursuant to the Superfund Act ("CER-
CLA7).c 8 These cases-as well as the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA)° 9-- make clear that it is appropriate for a court to re-
view the reasonableness of agency cost-benefit analysis.
Similarly, judicial review is appropriate when an agency re-
lies on cost-benefit analysis in a rulemaking, adjudication, or ex-
ercise of discretion, even when the underlying statute does not
require such analysis. Case law" ° and the APA' require the
court to review such agency action for reasonableness under the
"arbitrary and capricious" test. This implies that the court can
and should review the methods-especially the choice of discount
rate-that the agency used to perform the cost-benefit analysis."'
This Comment, however, focuses on cases where the underlying
statute contains a requirement for cost-benefit analysis.
B. The Standard of Review
Judicial review of discount rates involves two levels of analy-
sis. First, a court will consider whether the agency action-the
'Id at 1412-14.
'"880 F2d 432 (DC Cir 1989).
'MId at 465.
'5 USC § 706(2XA) (1994) (specifying the arbitrary and capricious test for judicial re-
view of agency actions).
"'See, for example, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 33-34 (1983) (finding that NHTSA abused its discre-
tion to issue motor vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need
for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms"); Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402, 416 (1971) (applying arbitrary and capricious test to
agency discretion where the statute required the agency to consider "feasible and prudent'
alternatives); National Coalition Against Misuse of Pesticides v Thomas, 809 F2d 875, 882-
83 (DC Cir 1987) (finding that EPA abused its discretion to promulgate pesticide tolerance
levels "to the extent necessary").
1115 USC § 706(2XA).
"'Arguably the APA implies that the choice of discount rate is insulated from judicial
review because it is "committed to agency discretion by law." 5 USC § 701(aX2) (1994). In
this case there is "no law to apply," Overton Park, 401 US at 410 (citation omitted); that is,
there is no statutory standard against which a court may judge the agency's use of its dis-
cretion. See generally, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, and Paul R. Verkuil, Ad-
ministrative Law and Process § 5.3 at 124-29 (Foundation 2d ed 1992). However, this ap-
proach is controversial among scholars. Compare Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrari-
ness and Judicial Review, 65 Colum L Rev 55, 77-83 (1965) (arguing that the "no law to
apply" rationale does not preclude judicial review for abuse of discretion), with Kenneth C.
Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise § 28.16 at 80-81 (West 1958) (arguing that where
there is "no law to apply," even abuse of discretion is not reviewable). Additionally, courts
regularly review the reasonableness of agency discretion under the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" test even when the underlying statute conveys broad discretionary power. See, for
example, State Farm, 463 US at 42-43, 51-57; Overton Park, 401 US at 411-413, 417.
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decision to discount and the choice of a particular discount rate-
represents an interpretation of the underlying statute that the
agency administers . This raises a question of law, subject to the
two-step standard of review in Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc."' If the agency action raises no
question of law, the court will review the agency decision for
abuse of discretion under the arbitrary and capricious test."5 As
this Part demonstrates, the threshold decision to discount argua-
bly is a question of law. In contrast, the choice of a particular dis-
count rate is largely a matter of agency discretion.
This Part first considers the question of law and argues that
courts generally have reached the right conclusion when they
have found that an agency acts unreasonably if it fails to discount
future costs and benefits. Next, the Part considers the question of
agency discretion, showing that courts have been unable to ar-
ticulate a meaningful test to determine whether the agency's
choice of discount rate is arbitrary and capricious. The Part con-
cludes, therefore, by offering a meaningful test and demonstrat-
ing how a court would employ the framework in Part II to take a
"hard look" at an agency's choice of discount rate.
1. Review of agency statutory interpretation: The decision
to discount future costs and benefits.
Chevron established the well-known standard of review for
questions of law."6 A court will defer to an agency's interpretation
of a statute if the interpretation is not contrary to the intent of
the statute (Chevron Step One) and if it is reasonable (Chevron
Step Two)." The court will apply "traditional tools of statutory
construction" to infer Congress's intent."8 It will test the reason-
ableness of the agency interpretation by determining whether the
agency considered all statutorily relevant factors and ignored
statutorily irrelevant factors."' This test of reasonableness, how-
"'A statutory interpretation (a question of law) is reviewable under 5 USC § 706(2XC).
"467 US 837, 842-45 (1984).
" Courts may review agency discretion under 5 USC § 706(2)(A), (D).
11467 US at 837.
"'Id at 842-45. See also Ohio, 880 F2d at 464 ("As petitioners point to no CERCLA
provision addressing the precise question in issue [the choice of discount rate], their bur-
den is to show that the imposition of the discount rate was unreasonable or contrary to the
statutory purpose.").
... Chevron, 467 US at 843 n 9. See also INS v Cardozo Fonseca, 480 US 421, 446-50
(1987) (employing tools of statutory construction); Babbitt u Sweet Home Chapter of Com-
munities for a Great Oregon, 515 US 687, 703-05 (1995) (same).
..See Chevron, 467 US at 845; State Farm, 463 US at 42-44.
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ever, tends to be quite similar to the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review that courts apply to agency discretion.2 '
Thus, when courts encounter challenges to agency discount
rates, Chevron Step One implies that they must first interpret
the statute in question to determine Congress's intent. However,
most statutes-such as TSCA and FIFRA--offer no particular
standards for conducting cost-benefit analysis, evidencing no con-
gressional intent as to the appropriate methods for choosing a
discount rate. This forces courts to proceed to the next level of
analysis-Chevron Step Two-and examine the reasonableness of
the agency decision.
Thus, in the few cases where courts have reviewed an
agency's decision to discount future costs and benefits, they have
focused on the reasonableness of the decision, not on whether the
decision is consistent with the purpose of the statute. In Corro-
sion Proof Fittings, for example, the court found that the EPA
would act unreasonably if it failed to discount future benefits:
"Because the EPA must discount costs to perform its evaluations
properly, the EPA also should discount benefits to preserve an
apples-to-apples comparison, even if this entails discounting
benefits of a non-monetary nature."" ' Similarly, in Ohio, the
court found that the Department of the Interior did not act un-
reasonably when it followed OMB guidance and discounted future
benefits." In neither case, however, did the court articulate a
standard of reasonableness. In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the court
held simply that an agency cannot discount costs without dis-
counting benefits;" in Ohio, the court deferred to the agency's
decision because it was "first and foremost a policy choice.""
Although they lack coherent explanations, Corrosion Proof
Fittings and Ohio reach the correct conclusion: discounting is
reasonable; not discounting is arbitrary.'25 However, the courts in
these cases could have reached the same conclusion more simply
by relying on the language of the underlying statutes (Chevron
Step One). A plain reading of statutory language requiring an
agency to consider "the reasonably ascertainable economic conse-
quences of the rule, after consideration for the effect on the na-
'"See Ronald M. Levin The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi-Kent
L Rev 1253, 1266-77 (1997) (demonstrating that analysis of a question of law under Chev-
ron Step Two is very similar to-indeed, may be identical to-arbitrary and capricious re-
view).
121947 F2d at 1218.
880 F2d at 465.
947 F2d at 1218.
880 F2d at 465.
"See the discussion in Part II.
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tional economy"' suggests that the agency should use reasonable
methods for evaluating the costs and benefits of a regulation.
This is precisely the conclusion in Gas Appliance Manufacturers
Association, Inc v Department of Energy,"2' where the D.C. Circuit
considered a statute requiring that regulations be "adequately
analyzed in terms of... economic cost and benefit, and impact
upon affected groups. " " The court found that this language re-
quired the agency to use reasonable methods in its cost-benefit
analysis." As demonstrated in Part II, reasonable cost-benefit
analysis includes positive discount rates for future costs and
benefits.
2. Review of agency discretion: The choice of a particular
I discount rate.
Most courts treat the choice of discount rate as a matter of
agency discretion."' Unless the underlying statute calls for strin-
gent review,"' courts will apply the APA's "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard of review to the agency's choice. 1 2 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this standard as requiring that courts take
a "hard look" at the agency's decision, inquiring whether the
agency provided a detailed explanation, investigated reasonable
alternatives, and considered statutorily relevant factors and ig-
nored statutorily irrelevant factors."
Although the standard of review calls for a "hard look," most
courts have taken a "soft look""4 at agency discount rates. In Cor-
"'TSCA, 15 USC § 2605(c)(1XD).
12 998 F2d 1041 (DC Cir 1993).
"Id at 1044, quoting the Energy Conservation Standards for New Buildings Act of
1976,42 USC § 6839 (1988), repealed by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub L No 102-486,
Title I § 101(a)(2), 106 stat 2776, 2783.
998 F2d at 1045-46.
"'See, for example, Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F2d at 1218 n 19 (concluding that
the EPA's choice of a 3 percent real discount rate was not unreasonable); Ohio, 880 F2d at
465 n 46 (deferring to agency choice of 10 percent rate); Northern California Power v
FERC, 37 F3d 1517, 1522-23 (DC Cir 1994) ("It was... entirely proper for the Commis-
sion to calculate the present value... using a discount rate that focused on the consum-
ers' value of money.").
.'TSCA, for example, provides for substantial evidence review. 15 USC
§ 2618(cXl)(B)(i).
"See 5 USC § 706(2)(A); Overton Park, 401 US at 413-16.
" See, for example, State Farm, 463 US at 43-44; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp
v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 435 US 519, 549-55 (1978); Overton Park, 401
US at 415-17. See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v FPC, 354 F2d 608, 617-
18, 620-22 (2d Cir 1965).
"'The term "soft look" is borrowed from Richard J. Pierce, Judicial Review of Agency
Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 Admin L Rev 61, 90 (1997) (char-
acterizing Judge Easterbrook's dissent in Salameda v INS, 70 F3d 447 (7th Cir 1995), as
the "soft look7 position).
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rosion Proof Fittings, for example, the Fifth Circuit deferred to
the EPA's choice of a 3 percent discount rate because "historically
the real rate of interest has tended to vary between 2% and
4 %." 5 The court did not consider alternative measures of the dis-
count rate, nor did it inquire whether the EPA applied this rate
appropriately. Similarly, in Ohio, the D.C. Circuit deferred to the
Department of Interior's choice of a 10 percent discount rate be-
cause the choice was "first and foremost a policy choice."36 De-
spite this conclusion, the court noted that the agency would need
to provide a "reasonable justification" if it revised its discount
rate in the future, although it gave no indication what such a jus-
tification would be.'
The D.C. Circuit has attempted to harden the prevailing "soft
look7 by inquiring into the theory underlying agency discount
rates. In Northern California Power Agency v FERC,' the parties
disputed whether the appropriate discount rate should reflect the
average discount rate of members of society (which FERC advo-
cated) or the cost of borrowing for city governments (which the
plaintiff municipalities advocated)." 9 After reviewing the basic
theory of discounting and citing a popular textbook,4 ' the court
concluded that the appropriate rate should reflect the discount
rate of members of society.' The court, however, did not inquire
whether FERC's particular rate (15 percent) was a good measure
of the appropriate social discount rate.
Similarly, in Herrington, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the dis-
count rate that the Department of Energy ("DOE") had used in
cost-benefit analysis of energy efficiency standards.' Applying
hard look review, the court found that the DOE failed to explain
how it derived this rate. In stark contrast to its approach in Ohio,
the D.C. Circuit held that the agency could not rely on OMB
guidelines to justify its choice: "The disputed OMB circular is es-
sentially a general instruction to government agencies and does
not explain the reasoning behind the discount rate it recom-
947 F2d at 1218 n 19.
880 F2d at 465.
'"Id at 465 n 46.
' 37 F3d 1517 (DC Cir 1994).
'"Id at 1522-23.
',"Id at 1523, citing E.J. Mishan, Cost Benefit Analysis 176 (Praeger 1976).
.. Id ("Additionally, when determining the net present benefit of a project, a discount
rate that reflects society's, as opposed to an individual's, preferences is commonly used. It
was therefore entirely proper for the Commission to calculate the present value of the net
benefits of the projects using a discount rate that focused on the consumers' value of
money. ") (citations omitted).
.768 F2d at 1410-14.
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mends."' The court stressed that the "major consequences of the
discount rate made it particularly important that DOE fix the
rate carefully and explain its decision intelligibly."' 4 Although
Herrington critically examined the DOE's decision, the case is
similar to other "soft look" cases because the court offers no stan-
dard of review for agency discount rates.
These cases show that, even where courts attempt to take a
hard look at agency discount rates, their inquiry generally ends
after testing whether the agency has provided at least a "tolera-
bly terse"45 explanation for its choice. Courts do not address the
other, "harder" elements of this review: whether the agency ad-
dressed reasonable alternatives and whether it considered statu-
torily relevant factors and ignored statutorily irrelevant factors.
Courts' "soft look" review of discount rates seems perverse when
they will apply a strict hard look review to other elements of
agency cost-benefit analysis.46 The problem appears to be that
courts lack a coherent framework for reviewing the agency choice
of discount rate.
In evaluating the choice of a discount rate, courts should un-
dertake a three-step analysis. First, as Herrington requires, a
court must find at least a "tolerably terse" explanation of the
agency's choice of discount rate. Second, the court should inquire
whether the agency considered reasonable alternatives. As ex-
plained in Part HI, the choice between the OCC and the SRTP ap-
proaches is primarily a matter of policy and secondarily a matter
of methodology.47 The court should find that an agency abused its
discretion if it failed to acknowledge these alternative approaches
and explain why, in its view, policy and methodology favor one
approach over another. Requiring such an explanation ensures
not only that the agency's decision has a rational basis, but that
the agency recognizes and responds to the social (and administra-
tive) costs and benefits of a particular approach.'
'"Id at 1413.
"Id at 1414.
"Id at 1413, quoting Greater Boston Television Corp v FCC, 444 F2d 841, 852 (DC Cir
1970).
'"See, for example, Competitive Enterprise Institute v NHTSA, 956 F2d 321, 323-27
(DC Cir 1992), where the court found that NHTSA acted arbitrarily by not considering the
risk-risk tradeoffs of new fuel economy standards. For analysis of this case, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U Chi L Rev 1533, 1565-67 (1996).
"See note 86 and accompanying text.
'"This is precisely the goal of hard look review, as explained by the Supreme Court in
State Farm, where the Court stated that "the agency must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between
the facts found and the choices made.'... In reviewing that explanation, we must 'con-
sider whether the decision was based on a consideration of relevant factors and whether
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Finally, given the agency's choice between the OCC and
SRTP, courts should examine whether the agency properly ap-
plied the chosen method. The OCC and SRTP involve very differ-
ent methodologies. If an agency applies the OCC, it must consider
whether the financial markets offer assets or trading strategies
with term structures similar to the proposed regulation. Addi-
tionally, the agency must adjust the market rates of return for
taxes, risk, inflation, and distortions due to credit constraints.
Finally, the agency should consider whether the regulation di-
verts resources from investment or consumption. In contrast, if
an agency applies the SRTP, a court should ask whether the
agency converted the future benefits of the regulation into con-
sumption equivalents. Additionally, the agency should reduce fu-
ture benefits to account for the fact that the regulation may di-
vert resources from private investment and thereby lower future
consumption. 49
Hard look review of agency discount rates would not take the
choice of a discount rate out of the hands of administrative agen-
cies, which possess greater competence than courts in this area.
Nor would hard look review tax judicial resources or require
judges to develop special expertise. Rather, hard look review of
agency choice of discount rates asks a series of simple questions
that courts generally ask when reviewing agency discretion: Is
there a record?.. Did the agency explain its choice between the
relevant alternatives, the SRTP and 0CC?'15 Did the agency con-
sider the relevant factors in applying either method?'52
Admittedly, hard look review of agency discount rates will
raise both the cost of judicial review and the cost of conducting
cost-benefit analysis. However, the costs of judicial review will
there has been a clear error ofjudgment.!" 463 US at 43 (citations omitted).
"'Hard look review should be particularly strict when an agency applies the SRTP.
This method raises more difficult policy issues and creates more complex methodological
problems than the OCC. Most academic studies indicate that agencies have very little ex-
perience applying this method. See Kopp, Krupnick, and Toman, Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Regulatory Reform at 41 (cited in note 89).
"See, for example, State Farm, 463 US at 43 ("We will ... uphold a decision of less
than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.") (citations omitted);
SEC v Chenery, 318 US 80, 94 (1943) ("[T]he orderly functioning of the process of review
requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed
and adequately sustained.").
"' See, for example, State Farm, 463 US at 43 ("Normally, an [agency decision] would
be arbitrary and capricious if the agency... entirely failed to consider an important as-
pect of the problem."); Scenic Hudson, 354 F2d at 624-25 ("The record as it comes to us
fails markedly to make out a case for the [agency decision] on, among other matters, costs,
public convenience and necessity, and absence of reasonable alternatives.").
"See, for example, Overton Park, 401 US at 416 ("[T]he court must consider whether
the [agency] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors.").
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rise only because courts to date have not given serious considera-
tion to agency discount rates. This increased cost is not problem-
atic, because both the APA ' and case law" require the level of
serious consideration implied by hard look review.
Additionally, although hard look review will impose costs on
agencies by requiring them to prepare detailed explanations of
their discount rate choices, these added costs are outweighed by
the benefits to society from more careful, reasoned consideration
of the methods used in cost-benefit analysis. A primary goal of
cost-benefit analysis is to help agencies identify the advantages
and disadvantages of various regulatory strategies and thereby
allocate their scarce budgetary resources toward regulations that
best promote social welfare. 5 ' By rationalizing and disciplining
agency decision making, cost-benefit analysis promotes the
regulatory efficiency as well as the political accountability of
agencies. 5 ' Yet, when agencies lack meaningful standards for
conducting the analysis, cost-benefit analysis is subject to ma-
nipulation, may be ridden with error, and has the appearance of
mere window dressing.5 ' Hard look review, therefore, strength-
ens cost-benefit analysis by giving agencies strong incentives to
develop consistent and theoretically sound methods of analysis.
C. Applying the Standard of Review to Agency Discount Rates
Hard look review would significantly alter the way agencies
select discount rates. As this Part illustrates, many recent dis-
count rate choices by agencies would not survive judicial review
under this standard.
Perhaps the most interesting application of hard look review
would involve OMB's guidelines for discount rates. Applying this
standard, a court would find that an agency cannot rely on OMB
guidelines to justify its choice of discount rate. Although OMB
adopts the OCC approach and provides an adequate explanation
for this choice, thereby surviving the first two levels of analysis
under hard look review, OMB fails the third level of analysis, be-
1"5 USC § 706(2XA) (requiring courts to set aside agency action that is "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law").
'" See text accompanying notes 138-44.
"For analysis of the pathologies of administrative decisionmaking in the absence of
effective cost-benefit analysis, see Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 10-29 (cited in
note 13) and Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 289-94 (Oxford 1997). See
also Thomas 0. McGarity and Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform,
31 Wake Forest L Rev 587, 622-32 (1996) (discussing the costs and benefits of cost-benefit
analysis).
"See Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 252-53 (cited in note 8).
"' See, for example, Scherega, 18 J Envir Econ & Mgmt at S-66 (cited in note 58).
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cause it does not sufficiently explain its application of the OCC
approach. In particular, OMB advocates a 7 percent discount
rate, unadjusted for taxes or risk.5 '
Likewise, EPA discount rates generally would not survive
hard look review. The agency chooses radically different discount
rates for different regulations, generally providing no explanation
for this variation."9 Indeed, EPA practice appears arbitrary be-
cause it often chooses relatively high discount rates (between 7
and 10 percent) for regulations imposing future costs" ° and low
rates (around 3 percent) for regulations creating future bene-
fits. '6 Because the agency offers no coherent explanation for
these choices, its discount rates would fail the second level of
analysis under hard look review.
In contrast, a recent DOE regulation likely would survive
hard look review. The agency provided detailed justification of its
discount rate in a rule setting energy conservation standards for
certain major household appliances.'62 After reviewing the theo-
retical and practical aspects of both the SRTP and the OCC, the
Department tentatively advocated the OCC approach, noting that
"consideration must be given to the opportunity costs of devoting
more economic resources to the production and purchase of more
energy-efficient appliances and fewer national resources to other
alternative types of investment." "os
Not all agency choices are as simple to evaluate under hard
look review. A harder case appears in a recent regulation by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"),
where the agency established standards for valuing damages to
natural resources and the costs of mitigating those damages.'
There NOAA considered both the SRTP and OCC, explaining the
"See notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
"The EPA generally offered no explanations for the regulations in Tables 1 and 2.
Consider, for example, EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 58 Fed Reg at 8163 (cited
in note 30).
"See, for example, EPA, Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New
Motor Vehicle Engines: Voluntary Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles, 62 Fed Reg 31192,
31215 (1997) (applying a 10 percent discount rate to pollution credits that the agency will
give to manufacturers of automobiles); EPA, Amended Proposed Test Rule for Hazardous
Air Pollutants, 62 Fed Reg 67466, 67477 (1997) (using a 7 percent discount rate to annu-
alize initial regulatory costs).
"' See, for example, EPA, LEAD; Requirements for Lead-Based Paint Activities in Tar-
get Housing and Child-Occupied Facilities, 61 Fed Reg 45778, 45808 (1996) (using a 3 per-
cent discount rate for "core" analysis of future benefits).
"DOE, Energy Conservation Program, 58 Fed Reg at 47333-35 (cited in note 29).
Id at 47335.
'"Department of Commerce, NOAA, Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed
Reg at 450-57 (cited in note 29).
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theory and methodological issues underlying each alternative."
The agency ultimately advocated a 3 percent discount rate for
valuing damages to natural resources because the rate is reason-
able in light of existing estimates of the SRTP, the rate is close to
the real after-tax rate of return on riskless Treasury bills, and a
relatively low discount rate may be appropriate for goods (natural
resources) that are not traded in a market." Unfortunately,
however, NOAA also concluded-without a coherent explana-
tion-that different discount rates should apply to the benefits
(the value of damages to natural resources) and costs (mitigation
of damages) of restoring natural resources. While the agency ad-
vocated the SRTP for benefits,'6" it supported the relatively high
OCC rate for costs.'8 This illogical decision should fail hard look
review.
CONCLUSION
The discount rate is a critical element of cost-benefit analy-
sis. The value of cost-benefit analysis in improving regulatory de-
cisions depends, in large part, on the reasonableness of the dis-
count rate. Small variations in the discount rate can significantly
bias the analysis. Despite the importance of the discount rate,
courts have failed to develop a standard of review for agency dis-
count rate choices. This is particularly troubling in light of evi-
dence that agency practice exhibits wide-ranging, and generally
unexplained, variation in discount rates. Not only do different
agencies employ different rates, but the same agency will some-
times apply different rates to different regulations without ex-
planation.
This Comment seeks to strengthen cost-benefit analysis by
providing a framework for judicial review of agency discount
rates. As a threshold matter, courts should find, as a matter of
law, that an agency acts unreasonably if it fails to discount future
costs and benefits, even if they accrue to future generations. Ad-
ditionally, courts should take a "hard look" at agency discount
rates and ask three basic questions: Is there a record for the
agency's choice? Did the agency explain its choice between the al-
ternative approaches to discounting, the SRTP and OCC? Did the
agency consider the relevant factors in applying the chosen
method? While these questions are standard fare in hard look re-
'.Id at 453-54.
'1MId.
"Id at 454.
'" Id at 456.
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view, they would represent a significant advance in judicial re-
view of discount rates. More importantly, hard look review would
provide strong incentives for agencies to adopt morally and eco-
nomically sensible discount rates.
The University of Chicago Law Review
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